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CHAPTER V 
"NOW WE CAN GO FORWARD" 
The state of the Houston Police Department was summed up by 
Mayor Holcombe in a message to the city council in January 1947: "The 
police department is woefully inefficient. It is honeycombed with feuds and 
factionalism. It is without discipline and i t  is badly undermanned.. . .The 
police department is worse than a South American Army."' Holcombe's 
harsh indictment, while politically motivated for the purpose of discrediting 
the previous administration for its operation of the police force, was an ac- 
curate description of the conditions that led to the police reform movement. 
The problem confronting the police of Houston was not unique. 
Professional growth suffered wherever police administration fell under 
political control. The plight of the police was as much a consequence of 
Mayor Holcombe's three previous terms in office as of any other factor. In 
the unstable environment resulting from a virtually institutionalized spoils 
system, the ineffectiveness and low morale of the police department 
became increasingly evident as additional demands were made on police 
services during the post-World War I1 years. Social dislocations and the ac- 
companying rise in crime clearly revealed the inadequacies of the city's 
police service. 
The most noteworthy characteristic of the Houston experience was 
that when reform occurred i t  came from within the police department, 
among career officers, especially the rank-and-file members. Reform was 
imposed neither from an external source nor from the higher echelon of 
the police department. No commissioner of extraordinary dynamism was 
appointed, as in the classic instance of Theodore Roosevelt's reform- 
minded police administration in New York City or in the more recent case 
of 0. W. Wilson's appointment as Superintendent of the Chicago Police 
Department. No Houston citizens' police committee organized to recom- 
mend a reform program. Rather, the police themselves instituted reform in 
spite of efforts by the city administration to discourage it. The struggle was 
bitter. No singIe individual dominated the police reform movement in 
Houston; leadership expressed itself through the Houston Police Officers 
Association (H POA) . 
State-chartered in 1945, the Association became a model for similar 
associations by other police departments in Texas. What began in Houston 
as a local effort, comprising less than two hundred police officers, became 
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by 1947 a statewide campaign involving seven municipal police depart- 
ments. In addition to cooperating with their colleagues in other cities, the 
Houston Association initiated an alliance with the Texas State Association 
of Fire Fighters. The  alliance was vitally important when measured by im- 
mediate reform goals, and it established a precedent for cooperation be- 
tween police and firemen that persists today. Their combined efforts were 
rewarded in 1947 with the passage by the Texas Legislature of a state civil 
service law that became the keystone for police reform and for the growth 
of a professional urban police service. 
The  first collective effort at reform was made in 1945 with the for- 
mation of the HPOA. T h e  Association was initially organized to combat the 
low morale among police officers and to counteract the unfavorable public 
image of the depariment. Accusations of police brutality had done much to 
discredit the department. Lack of training, the practice of employing 
political hirelings, and promoting unqualified men to ranking positions did 
much to undermine department discipline. In the black community, 
relations with the police, which had always been strained, deteriorated fur- 
ther during the war years. Alleged acts of brutality by police officers were a 
common cause of complaint by blacks, Altercations between police officers 
and blacks became more frequent as enforcement of the Jim Crow laws on 
city buses heightened tensions. Because of the war emergency, buses were 
overcrowded and adherence to the segregation laws became more difficult, 
with disputes between bus drivers and black passengers occurring 
regularly.2 
Charges of police brutality had a similar effect on the white com- 
munity. A rash of incidents in late 1945 was particularly detrimental t o  
police public relations. In September, for example, an incident involving the 
arrest of a woman focused unfavorable publicity on the department. The 
woman, a mother of two children, charged that she  was physically abused 
and that the arresting officer forced her to leave her children at her home 
unattended. Charges of aggravated assault were filed against the officer, 
who was then suspended from the force, and an indictment was returned 
by the grand jury. At the trial, the jury returned a not guilty verdict. But the 
stigma of the incident remained.3 
An even more damaging incident occurred in November 1945, when a 
newspaper reporter from the Post charged that h e  was beaten and choked 
by four officers in the city jail after being arrested for a traffic violation. An 
investigation was launched by Chief of Police Percy Heard, while a grand 
jury looked into the charges against the four men. Neither the police nor 
the grand jury investigations, however, found any wrongdoing by the of- 
ficers.4 T h e  effect of these and other widely reported incidents was to 
alienate the department from the public. Officers complained that their 
families were suffering ostracism from their neighbors as a result of the in- 
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cidents.5 Morale within the department ebbed. 
Despairing of assistance from the municipal authorities in improving 
conditions, a group of officers, headed by Lieutenants Fred Cochran and 
George Seber, Sergeant Curtis Aaron, and ten others, decided to form an 
organization to represent the needs and views of officers wishing to im- 
prove the department.6 The organizers received no encouragement from 
Chief of Police Heard, who, though sympathetic, thought anyone con- 
nected with the project risked dismissal by the administration. As a 
precaution, the proposal was presented to City Manager J.M. Nagle, who 
found that the project offered no threat to the administration.' The ob- 
jectives of the Association as outlined by its organizers were indeed modest. 
No one, even those who sponsored the Association, could foresee the 
course the new organization would take within the next two years. 
The stated objective of the HPOA, as detailed in a circular distributed 
to all members of the department, was to present "a united front in com- 
batting unfair actions against the individuals or the department as a whole" 
and to present "to the public.. . the true actions, aims and purposes of the 
Houston Police Department." An initiation fee of $4.00 and annual dues of 
$4.00 were set to defray the expense of social activities, advertisements, 
and attorney's fees when required. Following the initial planning, and the 
assurance by over two hundred of the department's rank-and-file members 
that they would join the Association, a charter committee was organized to 
secure a state charter. The request for a charter was approved in December 
1945, and shortly afterward Detective Frank L. Murray was elected first 
president. According to the charter, the purpose of the organization was to 
advance "any benevolent, charitable, educational or missionary un- 
dertaking, more particularly to promote and develop a friendly and fraternal 
spirit among all the employees of the police department, And to advance 
their mutual interest and to expand both moral and material aid to its mem- 
bers; to encourage athletics and social activities, and to generally increase 
the efficiency of individual members of the department as public ser- 
vants."* The language of the charter gave no indication of the reform 
program that the HPOA would eventually follow or of the political means 
that would be used to achieve its objectives. 
Several factors determined the direction of the HPOA's thrust. 
IronicaIly, the seeds of reform were first planted in 1939 by Mayor 
Holcombe's action in consenting to establishment of a police academy. In- 
terest in an academy had been stirred in 1937, when newly elected Mayor 
R.H. Fonville invited the New York police commissioner to recommend 
changes to improve the efficiency of the Houston police department. A 
result of the New Yorker's survey was the appointment of Detective L.D. 
Morrison to study at the New York City Police Academy. In 1939 
Morrison, then a captain, presented a plan to establish a similar training 
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school in Houston. The idea was accepted by Holcombe, who, during the 
interval, had been elected to his third term as mayor. Morrison was ap- 
pointed training director.9 Accompanied by much publicity, sixty recruits 
were selected from among several hundred applicants through the first 
series of competitive examinations administered in the department.10 The 
initial reaction of the public was favorable, but the outbreak of the Second 
World War overshadowed local concerns. After graduating its first class, the 
academy was abolished and was not reinstated until 1948. Moreover, the 
political environment was not conducive to the establishment of a per- 
manent academy, for patronage in the department and the uncertainty of 
tenure made impractical the time and expenditures required for con- 
tinuation of the six-week training course. 
Although the academy was short-lived, the training did impart to its 
graduates an aura of expertise that distinguished them from the other 
members of the department. Since training had ordinarily consisted only of 
street experience, the graduates, despite the brevity of their formal training, 
were distinguishable from their colleagues. Once on the force, however, the 
novice soon found that the idealism of professional police service as ex- 
pounded in the classroom did not conform to the realities of the service. 
For some men the discrepancy between idealism and reality provided the 
initiative to encourage change, It is significant that the first vice-president of 
the HPOA, who acted as its legislative agent and who later led the HPOA 
campaign in the state legislature for police reform, was a graduate of the 
academy. 
Another factor encouraging change was the impact of the Second 
World War veterans on the department. By 1945 an increasing number of 
recruits were military veterans, who looked upon police service as a career 
rather than as a temporary occupation. Generally better educated than the 
average police recruit of earlier years, and imbued with a determination to 
improve their situation, they sought more job security and status than their 
predecessors. Veterans, for example, formed the majority of police officers 
who in September 1945 enrolled in the newly established police science 
course at the University of Houston." Police service was gaining career 
respectability in urban areas throughout the United States. Not all members 
of the HPOA, however, shared the common interest in professional 
recognition. Some members were concerned only with increased salaries, 
retirement benefits, and improved public image, and had no  thought of 
institutional change.12 Even those men who were interested in achieving 
significant reform had no specific program to propose until 1946. Then, by 
accident, the reform goal was defined. In that year leadership in the HPOA 
fell to officers whose ambitions extended beyond monetary rewards and 
focused on  freeing the department from the corrupting and demoralizing 
effects of the spoils system. 
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T o  what extent the movement for change was influenced by similar ac- 
tivity in police departments elsewhere in the nation is uncertain. No  con- 
sensus o n  this matter exists among Houston police officers involved in 
organizing the HPOA. Publications such as the A tner~can Cily, the 
Municipal Review, the Journal of Crlmirial L a  KT, Ct.iminology and Police 
Science, the fn/et.nntionnl A.s.socia/~otl oj Chiefs of'Po11ce Bulk~tin, and local 
literature in other cities, particularly in California, existed thirty years ago. 
Information describing the developing professionalization of law en- 
forcement agencies in other areas of the country was widely disseminated 
and could have influenced developments in Houston. Moreover, there was 
a long history of police associations in the United States. The earliest, the  
New York City Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, had been founded in 
1892. In subsequent years, similar associations were founded in Buffalo, 
Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and other eastern cities, primarily to create greater 
fraternalism among police officers and to provide death benefits, health in- 
surance, and similar aids. In 1923 the Los Angeles Fire and Police Protec- 
tive League was founded, and i t  placed the Los Angeles Police Department 
in the vanguard of progressive police development. The  League made slow 
but steady progress in achieving job tenure during the 1 9 3 0 s  and beginning 
in the early 1940s initiated a campaign to educate the public and legislators 
to the need for well-qualified and well-paid personnel.13 
Yet, according to one leader in [he  Houston reform movement, 
organizers of the HPOA were unaware of the activities in other depart- 
ments. According to this view the Association was formed as a response to 
specific problems confronting police administration in Houston.14 Another 
member of the Association believed that military service during the war 
had brought men with law enforcement backgrounds together and had 
allowed for an exchange of ideas. 15 Although the source for the idea of the 
HPOA remains uncertain, several factors surrounding its organization are 
apparent. The HPOA was founded at a time when other urban police 
departments were attempting to gain improved status or working conditions 
either through union affiliation or professional organizations. It seems 
unlikely that members of the Houston department could have remained 
oblivious to these movements, especially unionization, even if personal 
communication with other departments was not routine. The  immediate in- 
spiration for forming the HPOA, however, was probably received from the 
Houston Fire Department, which boasted a chapter of the Texas State 
Association of Fire Fighters and had, in cooperation with chapters 
throughout Texas, engaged in a struggle to improve the status of firemen. 
In 1936 the TSAFF scored a major success: the legislature enacted the first 
state retirement system for municipal firemen. This success marked the 
TSAFF as a significant pressure group, demonstrated the potential of 
collective action to reform-minded police officers, and provided the im- 
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petus, if not the precise model, for police organization. 
The opportunity for cooperation between Houston police officers and 
firemen arose in June 1946. At that time the HPOA joined with the 
Houston chapter of the TSAFF to wring a municipal pay raise from the city 
council. The campaign began in April, when attorneys Arthur Mandel and 
Edwin De Coux, representing the associated firemen and policemen, peti- 
tioned the city council for a salary increase of $40 a month per employee. 
The proposed increase, which would have pushed the salaries of rank-and- 
file members of both departments from $180 to $220 a month, was re- 
jected by the city council. A counlerproposal for a $10-a-month boost was 
offered by City Manager Nagle, but it was in turn rejected by police and 
firemen. The 1920 referendum controversy was recalled when firemen 
spearheaded an effort to call a special election to decide the matter. This 
time the necessary signatures were obtained. Encouraged by the action of 
police and firemen, members of the City-County Employees Union joined 
in the demand for a $40-a-month increase for all 3600 city employees.16 As 
a consequence, the ballot consisted of three separate propositions to include 
policemen, firemen, and all other city employees. Despite threats by the 
city administration of lay-offs and a curtailment in public services, voters 
approved the three propositions in the June 22 special election by a seven- 
to-one margin. A proviso in the referendum also assured police and fire- 
men that their salaries could not be reduced without prior approval of the 
voters. 1 7 
The success of the 1946 campaign gave valuable experience to the 
leadership of the HPOA and enticed new members into its ranks. More 
significant than the winning of a salary increase was its impact on the future 
direction of the HPOA's program. Firemen had much in common with the 
police, since the former were equally vulnerable to political favoritism and 
suffered from the same lack of professional recognition. Concluding that 
the only means of securing job security and professional growth was to 
place themselves under a state civil service law, the TSAFF had since 1940 
pressed for such a law in the state  legislature.^^ By 1945 firemen in twenty- 
nine states had achieved state civil service protection,Ig but the bill met 
with strong opposition in the Texas Legislature, which on three occasions 
rejected bills sponsored by the TSAFF. 
A fourth bill was in preparation for introduction in the Legislature 
when the HPOA decided to adopt state civil service as the main objective of 
its reform program. Officials in the TSAFF recognized that an alliance with 
the HPOA would gain added support among conservative legislators.*o As a 
consequence, firemen attending the 1945 annual convention of the TSAFF 
voted to add the word "Policeman" to the proposed state civil service 
law.21 At the 1947 convention, President George Tipton of the TSAFF 
welcomed representatives from the HPOA as "brothers" in a common 
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cause and noted the cooperation received from the HPOA. 
You know It has been a great pleasure to work wrth the IHouston Polrce Depart- 
ment I t  has been a great inspirauon to . . . firemen. We recognize that we are all 
brothers In the same cduse and that we are dependent upon each other I invited 
quite a few police departments to send representatrves over here lo meet with us 
thrs time I would like lo get to know them better Mr. Christran of the Houston 
Police Department and two olher brothers there, I met on numerous occasions. 
They were present at most of our meetlngs that we had In Austin concerning our 
Legrslatrve problems. We recognrze the fact [hat there rsn't anythrng we do as a 
body here that doesn't affect thelml.. . . By leadrng the way, we encouraged the 
police to get . . . up; and we will assist you. 1 know the pol~cemen and firemen 
are here ready to look after your Interest, Irke they are wrth us.]? 
The resulting partnership became a lasting alliance, with representa- 
tives from the two organizations meeting before each legislative session to 
coordinate their efforts in deciding procedures and contacting key legisla- 
tors.23 The additional pressure placed on wavering legislators by police 
lobbyists together with the experience and organization of Texas firemen 
proved a formidable coalition, 
Once the objective of the police reform movement became known, the 
HPOA found itself in direct conflict with city authorities. Since the founding 
of the HPOA an important change had taken place in Houston municipal 
government. The council-manager form of city government, established in 
1942, was replaced in July 1947 by a strong mayor-council form of govern- 
ment.24 Holcombe was elected to serve his fourth term as mayor. He  
assumed office determined to realize the political potential afforded by the 
strong mayor government. The  enactment of a state civil service law for 
police and firemen seemed to threaten the municipal and political control of 
both departments. Consequently, the Holcombe administration vigorously 
opposed passage of the law. 
T h e  administration did not officially reprimand members of the 
HPOA; and since the HPOA was a state-chartered corporation, Holcombe 
could not force i t  to disband. Instead, he  exerted indirect pressure through 
the civil service commission and the police department hierarchy. The  
commission, for example, supported unjustified disciplinary actions against 
the advocates of reform, which in some  cases meant the  denial of promo- 
tions or, less seriously, the transfer of veteran officers to less desirable 
patrol locations. In addition, the department was carefuI not to employ any 
applicant who appeared disposed to join the movement. Publicity protected 
the leadership from the threat of dismissal, however.25 
Since most ranking officers owed their positions to political appoint- 
ments, they found the continuation of the status quo to their advantage and 
refrained from actively participating in the reform movement. Those rank- 
ing officers who opposed the HPOA resorted to tactics such as the  circula- 
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tion of rumors that officers belonging to HPOA would be dismissed, or 
labeling as radicals members who intended to force concessions from the 
city through strikes. Some critics of the reform movement were sincere in 
their fear of radicalism, but as later developments revealed, their fears were 
generally concerned with the possibility of losing political patronage. Mem- 
bers also were hindered from attending the association meetings by re- 
assignment of work schedules.26 To counteract these tactics, HPOA meet- 
ings were held at two different times to accommodate men on the different 
shifts. Some meetings involving policy decisions were held clandestinely in 
order to keep the plans of the HPOA secret. To avoid possible retaliation, 
some officers who paid their dues requested that their names not be placed 
on the membership list.2' The attempts to discourage membership failed, 
and within a year a majority of the department's rank-and-file as well as a 
few ranking officers openly professed membership in the organization. 
The success of the HPOA in organizing support was not limited to the 
Houston department. As news of the reform movement became known, 
interest was aroused among other police departments. They requested that 
representatives from the HPOA be sent out to explain its program and ob- 
jectives. In other instances the HPOA took the initiative and sent out 
speakers to convert the departments in neighboring towns. The first addi- 
tional cities to form associations were Abilene, Austin, Fort Worth, San 
Antonio, Sweetwater, and Waco.28 
Not all cities welcomed the formation of associations in their police 
departments or the enactment of a state-controlled civil service. Officials in 
some towns looked upon representatives of the HPOA as dangerous 
radicals and troublemakers, and their appearance in towns sometimes pro- 
voked hostile receptions. In Midland, Texas, for example, the police chief 
threatened to "turn the dogs loose" on the visiting HPOA representatives 
if they did not leave town at once. The response was milder in Dallas, 
where the chief of police simply ordered the doors of the police building 
locked when he learned that Dallas policemen planned to use the assembly 
room to meet with representatives from the HPOA.29 
The proselytizing efforts of the HPOA also brought the fledgling 
organization into conflict with the Texas Police Association (TPA) , which, 
before the formation of the HPOA, was the only agency representing the 
interests of police service in Texas. Membership in the Texas Police 
Association was open to all police officers, but the expense involved in 
financing and travelling to meetings generally excluded the rank-and-file 
members from active participation. As a result, Ieadership fell to police 
chiefs, who were appointed by city officials and reflected the interests of the 
municipalities. The TPA split with the HPOA came into the open when the 
TPA officials boycotted a scheduled meeting with Houston officers in Dallas 
to discuss the proposed civil service legislation. In protest, Houston 
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rank-and-file members returned their TPA membership cards. This mass 
resignation prepared the way for the formation of a statewide organization 
in 1950 to represent the interests of the ordinary policeman.30 
The break with the TPA marked the entry of the HPOA into an 
arrangement of new alliances. Once the HPOA joined the TSAFF in the 
campaign for state civil service, police reformers found allies among such 
liberal, reform-minded state legislators as Representatives Carleton Moore 
of Houston, Obie Jones of Austin, and J. B. Salles of Crockett, and Senator 
Kayle Viek of Waco, the Senate sponsor of the bill. The TSAFF prepared 
the groundwork for the alliance through years of cultivating political support 
for their legislative programs and establishing rapport with Iegislators. 
TSAFF lobbyists were aided by their state and national union affiliations 
and could depend on organized political pressure to assist 1hem.31 It  was 
this support which the police reformers gained when they became allied 
with the TSAFF in the campaign for a state civil service law; i t  was this 
support they depended upon in the years after 1947 to promote the 
professional status of police service through improved career benefits 
and state standards for law enforcement officers. Police reformers found 
that in these areas their hope for success resided with the reform-minded 
legislators. In matters of strict law enforcement legislation, however, they 
still sought the support of conservatives.32 The struggle for the passage 
of the state civil service law, heated and at times emotional, clearly placed 
the police at odds with those political interests with which they traditionally 
shared sympathies. 
The legislative debates centered on the issues of unionization, home 
rule, and political patronage. Apprehension among Iegislators that state civil 
service would allow unionization of police and firemen and the right to 
strike proved the most serious obstacle for the proponents of the bill to 
overcome. Throughout 1946 add 1947 fear of radicalism, generally con- 
sidered synonymous with labor unions, occupied much of the time of the 
legislature. A series of national and local strikes and labor problems intensi- 
fied these fears. In February 1946 these fears seemed realized, when 
Houston city officials were confronted with the demand of 2600 employees 
for a twenty-five per cent salary increase. The city's rejection of the demand 
precipitated a strike by 650 city workers, who found support from 20,000 
members of the A.F.L. construction craftsmen, 5000 of whom turned out 
for a march on City Hall. Only after the city workers joined with police and 
firemen in the initiative referendum of June did city officials accede to the 
call for higher salaries.33 A similar situation existed in Dallas, where C.I.O. 
representatives and the city administration clashed over the issues of inade- 
quate salaries and the latter's ordinance against a city employees' union.34 
Simultaneously, the C.I.O. launched a campaign to organize the entire 
state. The legislature in response to the increasing aggressiveness of labor 
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organizations and municipal employees enacted eight restrictive labor bills 
in 1947 during the fiftieth legislative session.35 
The concern over unionization and strikes by public employees ex- 
tended to the debate over the state civil service bill. Opponents of the bill 
accused its supporters of encouraging unionization of city employees and, as 
evidence, pointed to a section in the act which allowed firemen and police- 
men to become members of any organization not prohibited by the United 
States Constitution. An amendment striking out the offensive section was 
offered by Representative J. K. Aynesworth of Waco and won approval in 
the House committee. As an added precaution an amendment prohibiting 
municipal officials from bargaining collectively with firemen and policemen 
was introduced by Representative Marshall Bell of San Antonio. The 
amendment also forbade governmental officers to recognize public em- 
ployee labor unions and provided that striking employees be denied all civil 
service benefits. Following a sharp debate in the House, the amendment 
was approved by the narrowest of margins, 9 to 8.36 Shortly after its ac- 
ceptance, however, the Bell amendment was superseded by a law enacted 
in April by the Legislature, which prohibited public employees from collec- 
tive bargaining or striking.37 Unlike the amendment, the state law applied 
to all public employees, not merely to police and firemen. Neither the 
amendment nor the act was an obstacle to police reform, since police of- 
ficers had consistently rejected strikes and membership in labor organiza- 
tions. The amendment was directed primarily against the firemen because 
of their traditional ties with labor organizations. 
The clash of interests became most volatile during the public hearings 
of the Senate and House committees in February 1947 over the question of 
home rule and political patronage, with Houston spokesmen, both for and 
against the bill, dominating the debates. Houston councilman James S. 
Griffith was selected as chairman of the forces opposing the bill. A Houston 
delegation headed by city attorney George D. Neal, assistant city attorney 
George Eddy, and councilmen Tom Needham and James S. Bailey pre- 
sented the case against the bill. Representative Carleton Moore of Houston, 
sponsor of the bill in the House and a consistent supporter of the interests 
of police and firemen, was the leading spokesman for the bi11.38 T. C. 
Christian, a director in the HPOA, represented the organization's 420 
members at the hearings.39 
The municipalities argued that state civil service would infringe on the 
home rule amendment of the State Constitution by depriving municipal 
officials of control over local affairs. City attorney Neal, after studying the 
implications of a state civil service, concluded that the city council and 
mayor would "lose all control of the . . . police department" and recom- 
mended a concerted effort by the city ro defeat the measure. Shortly after 
Neal's recommendation a city council resolution was passed, charging that 
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the law would, if enacted, "deprive the city of Houston of local self- 
government and the right of self-determination as to purely local affairs and 
[was] a further attempt by the State Legislature to concentrate in the State 
government powers pertaining to local matters which, under our demo- 
cratic form of government, inherently belong to local governing bodies."40 
Eddy added that Houston already had a satisfactory civil service system and 
did not require state IegisIation, Supporters of the bill were charged with 
"wanting not job security, but job perpetuation without responsibility." 
This view was shared by the League of Texas Municipalities, which 
also saw the law as a dangerous centralization of power in the hands of 
Austin legislators. Spokesmen for the League also feared that cities would 
be burdened with expensive pension systems, minimum salary scales, and 
other benefits for police and firemen. A similar concern for the loss of 
home rule was expressed by Houston's leading newspapers. The Chron~cle 
discerned, for example, a similarity between the encroachment by the 
Federal government in state affairs and the infringement of local home rule 
by the state.41 Witnesses for the bill from Houston and other municipalities 
hammered at the abuses that existed under municipal civil service and cited 
examples of political favoritism to substantiate their claim that political 
spoilsmanship was at stake and not home rule.42 At one point in the 
debates Moore exhibited a detailed list of names and service records of 
Houston police officers who had been demoted following the mayoral elec- 
tion of 1946. In three conspicuous cases, Moore pointed out that two in- 
spectors of police had been demoted to lieutenant and a third to office clerk. 
Moore then charged that the only opponents of state civil service were 
"those sucking the teat of the public treasury." So emotional was the issue 
that Moore alleged that he was physically threatened by a Houston city offi- 
cial who became enraged over Moore's support of the bi11.43 
The verbal exchanges during the committee hearings provided an ex- 
citing spectacle for the visitors' gallery, but i t  was the parliamentary 
maneuvering behind the scenes that decided the fate of the bill. Passage of 
the bill remained uncertain despite the cooperative efforts of police and fire 
association lobbyists. Numerous amendments were added in the House and 
Senate, and several sections of the original bill were deleted as legislators 
struggled to produce a compromise law that would, to some extent, satisfy 
the demands of both sides. The most controversial amendment was the 
local option proviso, which attempted to appease city officials who claimed 
the law would jeopardize home rule. The local option requirement made 
referendum elections mandatory in all the municipalities affected by the law 
ninety days after its enactment. By this means voters were given the choice 
of either rejecting or approving the law. Under pressure from municipal 
authorities, a section was also added that the law, after being in effect for at 
least five years, could be repealed in a special referendum if the voters de- 
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cided to reject the measure. Although Moore and his supporters managed 
to persuade House Committee members to reverse themselves on the local 
option section, the Senate Committee, by a narrow margin, retained it in 
their version of the bill and the civil service proponents accepted it rather 
than risk rejection of the whole bi11.44 
The local option requirement provided the city administration with a 
last opportunity to prevent enactment of the law. The administration made 
no public effort to defeat the law. I t  did, however, exert pressure on indi- 
viduals in the community who owed favors to the administration to per- 
suade others to oppose the measure.45 Police and firemen countered this 
maneuver by appealing directly to the public, explaining the need for a state 
civil service system and reminding voters of the effect of political patronage 
on both departments. In a referendum election held on January 31, 1948, 
the voters approved the law by nearly a 6,000-vote margin. The civil serv- 
ice provisions of the city charter pertaining to policemen and firemen were 
repealed, and state civil service regulations became effective.46 
The law provided the police with two main objectives of the police 
reform movement-freedom from the demoralizing effects of political 
patronage and guaranteed access to the courts. Under the new law, police 
officers dissatisfied with declsions of the Civil Service Commission were 
assured the right to have appeals tried de novo in the Dislrict Court. The 
previous condition that the only grounds for appeal were gross negligence 
and prejudice on the part of the commission was eliminated. Under the de 
novo proviso police officers were guaranteed trials in which all the details of 
their cases would be reviewed by the court. In addition, District Court 
judges could no longer delay appeals as they had done in the past. Cases in- 
volving appeals from police officers were ordered to be advanced on the 
docket of the District Court, taking preference over other cases.47 
All police officers were included under the law, except the chief of 
police, who remained an appointee of the mayor. Any officer certified as a 
bona fide law enforcement officer with at least five years experience was 
eligible for appointment as chief. Although nor included under the state 
civil service law, the police chief when dismissed could not be reduced 
below the rank held prior to his appointment as chief.48 Later amendments 
to the law extended to the chief of police the same right of appeal to the 
civil service commission enjoyed by other officers in the department.49 
In contrast to the weak and contradictory city civil service system, the 
state law provided stability. Civil service regulations could no longer be 
altered by approving an ordinance or resolution. Changes under the state 
system could be made only by an act of the legislature that would affect all 
police departments under state civil service. The widespread applicability of 
the law made unlikely the passage of laws reflecting solely local interests. 
Local political control of the department through manipulating the civil 
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service rules was eliminated, even though the members of the civil service 
commission continued to be appointed by the mayor as they had been un- 
der municipal civil service. All commissioners were required to meet the 
qualifications outlined in the state law, which also provided that the terms 
of commissioners be staggered or rotated to eliminate the past practice of 
having the terms of the commissioners coincide with that of the mayor.50 
Under the state civil service law the commissioners administered 
both the state civil service law and the municipal civil service rules pertain- 
ing to the police department. Procedures for filling positions, assigning 
promotions, making suspensions, and dismissals were all regulated by 
state law. Regulations governing the daily operation of the department, 
such as those setting salaries and work shifts, remained in the hands of 
the city, Finally, active political participation, except for voting, was 
strictly prohibited, as was the solicitation of funds or services from police 
officers by political candidates.5 1 
With the passage of the state civil service law, the legal status of police 
officers was at last brought into conformity with the principles of effective 
civil service. In effect, the law assured policemen, as Carleton Moore poin- 
ted out in support of the bill, "that whenever they [public officials] want to 
demote. . .or discharge. . . they have. . . to put it [their accusation] in 
writing over their signature and prove it."52 
Passage of the bill, however, did not result in the immediate trans- 
formation of the police department. Numerous political appointees re- 
mained in the classifications they held before the law became effective, 
since the provisions of the state law were not retroactive. The new regula- 
tions on promotions and demotions became effective only after the act was 
signed.53 Holcombe sought to retain as much influence on the police force 
as possible by making transfers, creating new positions, and promoting 
favorites to desirable positions before the establishment of the new system. 
The promotions were made with the utmost secrecy until the moment the 
changes were announced. In conference, Chief Payne and Mayor 
Holcombe agreed upon the promotions, and they submitted the names to 
Controller Roy Oakes, who certified the availability of funds to cover the 
increased salaries. The list of names was then submitted to the 
acting civil service director, Knox D. Womack, who informed members of 
the commission of the promotions. The action was conducted so secretly 
that by oversight an announcement of the promotions was not included on 
the commission's agenda for release to the newspapers at the meeting later 
that day.54 
The municipal civil service rules required the commission to announce 
publicly the names of those persons who had passed the oral examination 
and had received promotions. Noting the oversight following the close of 
the meeting, the commission told the newspapers that the page of the 
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agenda listing the promotions had been missing at the meeting but that 
copies were now available at the civil service commission office.55 Once 
state civil service became effective, the men promoted were secure in their 
positions unless suspended or discharged in accordance with the new regu- 
lations. This negative aspect of the state civil service system was recognized 
by advocates of the law and accepted as a temporary drawback. Eventually 
such men, as they retired from the force, would be replaced by officers pro- 
moted through the process of competitive examinations. Reformers be- 
lieved the department would acquire the trappings of professionalism in 
approximately twenty years. 
The civil service system required time to function in the manner its 
sponsors intended. Clarification of certain provisions of the Iaw was re- 
quired before its full implications could be determined. The precise limits of 
the right to "trial de novo5'in district court, for example, were not immedi- 
ately apparent. A series of test cases initiated by policemen, firemen, and 
cities marked the two decades following enactment of the law. Through liti- 
gation the substantive and procedural questions of the right of appeal were 
answered. In 1953 the civil appeals court ruled in the Simpson case that 
"trial de novo" was a trial to decide whether a ruling of the commission was 
free from illegalities and "reasonably supported by substantial evidence." 
The scope of the court's review was limited strictly to questions of law, 
while the only question applicable to the trial court was whether the civil 
service commission's "decision was reasonably supported by substantial 
evidence." The latter decision was important in preventing the courts from 
assuming the function of the commission by insisting that all evidence had 
to be presented by the appellant at the hearing rather than be withheld and 
submitted to the court on appeal.56 
In the 1958 Kavanagh case, which involved the demotion of a poIice 
detective, the court gave a definitive interpretation to the term "trial de 
novo." The court declared the meaning of the term to be that the appellant 
was "entitled to introduce evidence so that the court can determine on a 
basis of the whole record, as made in the trial court, whether there was in 
existence at the time of the order of the Commission, evidence of a sub- 
stantial nature reasonably supporting the order, and the court may not sub- 
stitute its findings for those of the commission if there is such evidence."57 
Other decisions dealt with admissible evidence and questions of juris- 
diction.58 Together the decisions offered proof to skeptical officers that the 
law was indeed a viable instrument for protecting their rights. 
Although in 1948 the precise dimensions of the law were yet to be 
measured, the right of appeal to district court did guarantee officers im- 
mediate relief from arbitrary dismissal or demotion. A severe test of the 
protection offered by the law occured in 1950-51, when a gambling scandal 
engulfed the police department. The scandal was an outgrowth of the long- 
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standing practice of discriminatory enforcement of the gambling laws. Like 
the other negative aspects of police service in Houston, the department's 
involvement in the city's gambling operation was accepted by most officers 
as a condition of employment. Resentment was keen among some mem- 
bers of the department who thought such conduct demeaning, but the 
long-standing distrust created by years of factionalism in the department 
discouraged overt opposition. As one officer later testified "at that time 
[I9491 I didn't know who to trust and who not to trust. The town was wide 
open, and I figured there was bound to be a pay off."s9 Those who at- 
tempted to expose the department's lax policy toward the enforcement of 
gambling laws risked reprisals such as those experienced by Roe and 
McGrew in 1935.60 Events in 1950-51 tested whether the enactment of 
state civil service had altered the situation. 
The gambling issue gained notoriety in August 1950, when the owner 
of a local tavern charged that she made payments to members of the police 
department to keep her business open after legal hours. A grand jury began 
a month-long inquiry into irregularities in the police department and 
eventually extended its inquiry to the mayor's office. As a consequence of 
the investigation, Night Chief M. M.  Simpson and a subordinate officer 
were dismissed by Chief of Police B. W. Payne, who in turn was forced to 
resign under pressure.61 More important, the investigation provided an op- 
portunity for dissidents within the department to vent their frustration. 
Open rebellion erupted when several officers conducted independent raids 
against businesses displaying punchboards and other gambling para- 
phernalia. The revolt intensified when officers stepped forward to testify 
about police irregularities before the grand jury and later at the civil service 
commission hearing inquiries into the dismissal of the night chief for his 
alleged involvement in the irregularities. The fate of these defiant officers 
constituted a test of the effectiveness of the State civil service Iaw. 
The unofficial raids were begun by patrolmen Walter Rankin and 
Aaron Curtis in company with a Houston photographer. The two poIicemen 
made gambling arrests and gathered evidence. Although the arrests were 
not officially sanctioned, William P. Haley, the inspector of the uniform 
division, provided encouragement and support for the raids despite criticism 
from Payne that the raids were in violation of the department rule that only 
members of the gambling squad were allowed to make gambling arrests. 
Whenever uniformed or other officers observed gambling activities-which 
were prevalent throughout the city-they were required to report their fin- 
dings to the head of the gambling squad.62 In response to the criticism, 
Haley defiantly replied that he was "tired of being criticized by the public 
for not enforcing all the laws.. . .Now that all of my uniform officers know 
that I expect them to enforce the law where and whenever they find it being 
violated, I expect them to do so.. . .If I get a report of a flagrant violation, I 
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don't see why I should turn it over to anyone. In fact I'm not going to."63 
The appointment of L. D. Morrison as chief of police in October 1950, 
following Payne's resignation, brought an end to the new policy. A series of 
raids was conducted against known gambling establishments as the depart- 
ment and the Holdombe administration reacted to the pressure generated 
by the grand jury's investigation and its interest in the possible connection 
between gambling interests and the administration. During the investiga- 
tions the administration made no effort to have any of the dissident officers 
demoted or dismissed, as had been done in the past. Several officers com- 
plained, however, that they had received threats of physical harm and sus- 
pected that their homes were kept under surveillance by unknown parties.64 
The final chapter in the scandal began in December, when Night Chief 
Simpson, acquitted of bribery charges in district court, filed for reinstate- 
ment with the civil service commission. The resulting commission hearing 
drew an increased number of officers willing to testify about the city's gam- 
bling operations in spite of embarrassment to the administration and 
ranking officers. Those testifying found assurance in the fact that no 
reprisals had been taken against officers participating in the grand jury 
inquiry. They were further encouraged when the HPOA recommended that 
Chief Morrison oppose Simpson's reinstatement.65 On December 21, the 
commission, by unanimous vote, upheld the dismissal. The decision was 
viewed by officers as a victory for law enforcement reform in Houston. As 
Chief of Police Morrison commented following the decision, "It's a real 
victory for the do-right policemen. It was a fair trial. Officers have demon- 
strated they are fed up with any system or individual who tends to tie their 
hands in carrying out their sworn duty." Looking to the future, Haley ad- 
ded that "I'm happy for the men and our department. Now we can go for- 
ward."66 
The significance of the episode lies not so much in the expose'of the 
department's role in the gambling operations as in the successful function- 
ing of the state civil service law. No police officers who had given informa- 
tion about department irregularities or who had testified against ranking of- 
ficers were demoted or dismissed. Moreover, those officers accused of 
wrongdoing received open civil service commission hearings. The com- 
mission demonstrated its independent decision-making capacity by affirm- 
ing the dismissal of an administration proteg6.67 Fifteen years earlier similar 
action taken by officers Roe and McGrew resulted in their dismissal from 
the force and demotions for others less conspicuously involved. Conditions 
had now reversed themselves. 
The episode established the credibility of state civil service. Its effective 
operation guaranteed officers a means of presenting evidence before an im- 
partial investigatory agency. Such a guarantee, reinforced by the right of ap- 
peal to the district court, acted as a potent deterrent to political discipline 
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and pressures. The continued effectiveness of the law during periods of 
local political discord, which in former years would have engulfed the 
department and its members, testified to its durability. As a recent state 
study on methods to encourage professional law enforcement noted, the 
state civil service law provided the basis for professional police service in 
Texas. Indeed, the study recommended statutory refinements to expand 
the scope of the law as the means to "encourage the true professionaliza- 
tion of police service."6* 
Enactment of the state civil service law was only the first success of the 
reform movement toward fulfilling the ideal of professional police service, 
but. it was a crucial first step. With tenure of office and appointments regu- 
lated by state law, police officers were able to look upon police service as a 
permanent career rather than as a temporary occupation. The transition 
from occupation to career was an essential prerequisite for professional 
development. 
In 1950 the various municipal police associations under the leadership 
of the HPOA were brought together into a state-chartered organization un- 
der the title of the Texas Municipal Police Association.69 TMPA provided a 
means for common action at the state level. Police lobbyists from Houston 
and elsewhere, acting under the auspices of the new statewide Association, 
sponsored and supported legislation to improve the welfare of police officers 
and the quality of police service. The organization scored a major victory in 
1951, when police legislative agents, working in cooperation with reform- 
minded state legislators, guided through the legislature laws banning slot 
machines, policy games, and punch-cards.70 These laws, by effectively un- 
dercutting the influence of racketeers in financing political campaigns, eli- 
minated the chief corrupting influence on the police and contributed signifi- 
cantly to the advancement of responsible law enforcement. 
Since 1947 numerous bills have been enacted dealing with pensions 
and working hours; most recently, in 1956, a bill created the Law Enforce- 
ment Oficers Standard and Education Commission.71 The law established 
for the first time a nine-member board to set professional standards for 
municipal police departments in Texas. Two of the Commission's most im- 
portant duties were to set certification standards for law enforcement of- 
ficers and to recommend a program for the upgrading of the police service 
with the ultimate goal of requiring baccalaureate degrees in either the 
behavioral sciences or the law for all certified peace officers in Texas. The 
existence of the Commission was an acknowledgment of the need to regu- 
late the standards for peace officers and to standardize the level of com- 
petence needed to create a body of professional peace officers.72 Though it 
is still a fledgling organization, its potential use as a professional licensing 
and regulatory agency is a real possibility. 
The development of the professional ideal had its roots in the rrans- 
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formation that the complexities of urbanized society brought to policing. 
Policing was transformed from a merely coercive process grounded in the 
legacy of the nineteenth century to one based on the community service 
depicted so vividly by Chief of Police E.C, Noble in his annual message to 
the city council in 1913. As a convenient and visible representative of the 
establishment, the police department inherited a myriad of {asks unassoci- 
ated with the enforcement of criminal laws and demanding occupational and 
managerial expertise. As the legal status of policing became clarified and its 
vital function in the community was recognized, the police saw in their 
calling a uniqueness or self-awareness distinct from that of other occu- 
pations. With the formation of an organization to advance the interests of 
responsible police service and the outlawing of political patronage, policing 
gained career respectability. 
Consciousness of a professional ideal does not insure its achievement. 
The state civil service law provided the stability needed for professional 
development, while the HPOA and TMPA provided the means of ex- 
pression. But the direction of that expression can only be dictated by indi- 
vidual police officers determined to fuIfill the ideals of professional police 
service in the daily performance of their duties. Ultimately, the degree to 
which police officers are able to perform their duties without regard to 
racial, political, or social considerations is the yardstick by which the attain- 
ment of professionalism in police service will be measured. 
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